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BAD FOR PRACTICE – GOOD FOR PRACTICE FROM ECONOMIC 
IMPERIALISM TO MULTIDISCIPLINARY MAPPING 
Margit Osterloh 
Institute of Organization and Administrative Science, University of Zurich, Switzerland 
Jetta Frost 
Department of Business Administration, University of Hamburg, Germany 
Abstract: There is a growing argument that economics can no longer provide any 
guiding schema for solving current management problems. Economic assumptions 
even destroy good and socially responsible management practice. In this paper, we 
analyze two reasons why standard economics can indeed be bad for managerial and 
political practice. One is the negative influence of wrong assumptions in economic 
theory building which become self-fulfilling prophecies. Another important factor is 
economic imperialism. We argue that psychological economics is better for practice 
than standard economics, but that it is still not good for practice as long as it uses an 
imperialistic approach. We propose a different research strategy to apply for problem 
solving in management practice, which we call multidisciplinary mapping. It 
overcomes the problem of imperialism, not only because it builds bridges between 
different disciplinary approaches, but also between the knowledge of theorists and the 
expertise of practitioners. Mapping is useful for realizing. It is good for practice as 
well as for theory building. 
Keywords: economics, psychological economics, multidisciplinary mapping, maps, 
management practice, theory 
INTRODUCTION 
Current discussion about corporate scandals, the explosion in management pay and disastrous 
consequences of the transition process in Eastern Europe has given rise to the question of whether 
economics might be the wrong theory to solving current management problems. It is argued: economics is 
bad for practice (e.g. Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Although the aim of organizational research is to discover, 
describe order, explain, and predict carefully defined social phenomena that characterize behaviors in 
organizations, the following examples briefly sketch negative influences of economic research on the 
practice of management and politics.  
 Ghoshal (2005), in a posthumously published article, lamented the fact that standard economic 
theories currently dominating the debate over corporate governance had wrecked good management 
practices and led to wrong decisions on incentive schemes or counter-productive pay for performance 
systems. These scandals are interpreted as the consequence of the dominant principal-agent and transaction 
cost view in corporate governance (see also Adler, 2002; Osterloh & Frey, 2005). The standard economic 
view is based on the assumption that opportunism is a worst-case scenario. Opportunism is considered to 
be a prudent consideration for institutional structures (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1996). 
However, prevalence of standard economic assumptions in the training of new managers at reputable MBA 
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centers leads to a situation in such a conception of human beings as opportunists tends increasingly to 
become reality. It would appear that the criticism voiced by Ghoshal and Moran (1996) in their frequently 
quoted article “Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory,” is true: Williamson’s (1985) 
transaction cost approach is not only wrong but dangerous for guiding management and policy decisions.  
 Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005) state that in the social sciences - unlike physical sciences - theory 
becomes normative guidance on how to act; the result is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The greater the 
influence the theories have, the more this is the case. In their view, this is also true of economics. The 
authors draw on Merton’s definition of a self-fulfilling prophecy as a prediction that “is, in the beginning, a 
false definition of a situation which denotes a behavior that makes the originally false conception come 
true” (Merton, 1948: 195). 
 Kogut and Spicer (2005) analyze the negative impact of economics on the transition process in Russia. 
They argue that the disastrous development in Russia is the result of the strong institutional ties of 
economists of Harvard and MIT to the World Bank and the international policy arena. The development in 
Russia in the nineties is characterized by a picture far worse than in other transition countries, with respect, 
for example, to the development of life expectancy, infant mortality and living standards prior to the 
reforms. The authors explain these negative consequences of the reform process in Russia by the 
dominance of economists and the near total “no-show” of non-economic disciplines like sociology and 
psychology. 
 The aim of our paper is firstly to point out why theories, particularly in economics, are often bad for 
management practice. We argue that being bad for practice is not only a problem of false assumptions but 
also a methodological problem. The latter problem lies in an imperialistic use of single theories, as is the 
case with economic imperialism. This problem will not disappear if economic theory is built upon more 
empirically valid assumptions about human nature. We demonstrate this with the example of the new and 
strongly growing branch of psychological economics which has questioned some crucial assumptions 
about standard economics as being endogenous to theory building and thus is clearly better for practice. 
However, if psychological economics uses the same methodology as standard economics in an 
imperialistic way; it is still bad for practice. Secondly, we will answer the question: Which research mode 
is good for practice as well as good for theory building? We propose a different research mode for 
management research: multidisciplinary mapping. It provides different disciplinary maps to gain insights 
from the difference between disciplinary views as well as between the views of scholars and practitioners. 
ARE ECONOMICS BAD FOR PRACTICE? 
In this section we will outline the standard economic model, its critics, and the model of psychological 
economics to show the methodological procedure of economics and its shortcomings.  
The Standard Economic Model and its Critics 
The standard economic model of homo oeconomicus is characterized by the following assumptions (e.g. 
Frey, 1999): 
• Action is centered in the individual (methodological individualism). Everything that happens in 
institutions and society can be traced back to the actions of individuals. 
• A strict distinction is to be drawn between preferences (i.e. values which form the basis of motivation) 
and restrictions (i.e. external stimuli of action and constraints on the scope for action).  
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• An individual’s preferences are given and inalterable (Becker & Stigler, 1977). The individual’s 
actions are determined entirely by restrictions.  
• Only self-interested, not pro-social, preferences are assumed to exist. The preferences of other people 
do not concur with one’s own preferences.  
• The cognitive perception of restrictions is identical in all individuals.  
• Individuals behave entirely rationally. They are able to determine their own maximum utility 
according to their own preferences within given restrictions.  
It is on the basis of these assumptions that the standard economic model is applied to all spheres of life, for 
instance, to the family, drug abuse, abortion, criminality, art, sport, religion, and suicide. This is tied to the 
withdrawal (or, better, the ejection) of psychology from economics, which for Schmölders (1962) for 
instance, was still part of economics. Neoclassical standard economics has thus developed an imperialistic 
understanding of itself as the “queen of the social sciences” (Hirshleifer, 1985; Becker, 1976), a view 
which has provoked significant aggression and criticism among neighboring social sciences. Criticism of 
standard economics refers chiefly to these assumptions. In particular, this is about the assumptions 
regarding the cognitive and motivational characteristics of homo oeconomicus.  
 The criticism of the assumptions about the cognitive characteristics of homo oeconomicus is the least 
controversial. They go back to Simon (1955, 1956) and have led to the idea of bounded rationality as a 
consequence of people’s limited capacity to process information. In contrast to the discussion of his 
cognitive characteristics, the criticism of the assumptions regarding the motivational characteristics of 
homo oeconomicus is controversial. One bone of contention is the assumption of self-interest, which has 
been significantly intensified in the transaction cost approach by the assumption of opportunism as the 
“seeking of self-interest with guile” Williamson (1985: 56). This argument is the backbone of the criticism 
of self-fulfilling prophecy: If institutional designs (e.g. measurement and incentive systems or selection 
processes) as well as expectations and frames are directed towards selfishness, people will react as if 
everybody is an opportunist. A framing and crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation will take place.  
Psychological Economics and its Critics 
Psychological economics is a combination of economics and psychology.1 It is concerned with the 
systematic divergence of human actions from the standard economic model of homo oeconomicus while 
retaining economic methods (e.g. Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004; Camerer & Malmendier, 2004; Frey & 
Benz, 2007; Kahneman, 2003; Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000; Rabin, 1998). It questions the ‘homunculus 
oeconomicus’ in three ways: through the issues of (1) bounded rationality, (2) bounded self-interest, and (3) 
the bounded utility concept. 
 (1) Bounded rationality: The findings of psychological economics go far beyond the vague concept of 
bounded rationality as applied in institutional economics. These show that divergences from the expected 
maximization of utility follow systematic conditions, which are dealt with under the term “decision 
anomalies.” It is largely with this term that Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1986) have founded the 
psychological economics branch of research.2 Important decision anomalies include: 
• Framing: the perception of a decision situation depends on the presentation of the situation.  
• Anchoring: the appraisal of outcomes is influenced such that the first anchor is held against the final 
judgment, and new information is given less consideration as a result.  
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• Availability bias: individuals rely chiefly on easily gained information.  
These decision anomalies contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy effect: If the prevailing information you 
get leads you to an opportunist frame you will design institutions as if all or most people were opportunists. 
Empirical evidence shows that even experts are subject to these decision anomalies. In situations of great 
uncertainty, experts are more strongly affected by these decision anomalies than lay people, because they 
trust too much in their models and past data (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). In an experiment, the Economist 
(1984; 1995) found that dustmen were able to make better long-term predictions about economic 
development than ministers of finance.  
 (2) Bounded self-interest: In contrast to the assumptions of standard economics, numerous empirical 
results indicate that in many situations, people behave against their own interest in an intrinsically 
motivated prosocial manner. Intrinsic motivation is directed towards activities which are performed for 
their own sake rather than for any reward (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1997; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). 
Extrinsic motivation, in contrast, is aimed instrumentally at activities which are not valued for their own 
sakes. They are, rather, undertaken for a desired reward or to avoid a penalty. Standard economic 
approaches deal exclusively with extrinsic motivation. 
 A dynamic relationship exists between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Under certain conditions, 
extrinsic motivation can crowd out intrinsic motivation. This leads to what have been termed the hidden 
costs of rewards; the existence of these hidden costs is well supported empirically by both laboratory 
experiments and field studies (Frey & Jegen, 2001). These show that, under certain conditions, external 
interferences (like pay for performance or monitoring) can crowd out pro-social intrinsic motivation (Frey 
& Oberholzer, 1997; Stukas, Snyder & Clary, 1999).3 The crowding-out effect provides a theoretical and 
empirical well-founded explanation for the self-fulfilling prophecy of the assumption of opportunism. If 
this assumption is introduced exogenously into theory building as an a priori, as is the case in orthodox 
economics, then organizations will be designed to monitor and induce their members with carrots and 
sticks. Their preferences will change from intrinsic to extrinsic or even opportunistic.  
 (3) Bounded utility concept: In standard economics, it was, until recently, the case that only 
observable acts (“revealed preferences”) could be the object of economic study - but not what was 
subjectively perceived. In this view, individuals’ expressions of their subjectively felt utility, their 
happiness or their life satisfaction cannot be trusted (Samuelson, 1938). However, a dramatic change has 
occurred in recent years. A variety of methods have captured how happy individuals feel, which 
determinants are decisive for this, and what the measurable consequences arise from this are (for an 
overview, see Frey & Stutzer, 2002a; 2002b). Happiness research has brought about a near-revolutionary 
change in economics. It captures those determinants of subjective life satisfaction or individual welfare 
that are the most important. Some of these clearly contradict the assumptions of standard economics, such 
as: 
• Wealth makes people happy, but to a lesser extent than such factors as health or an occupation. It is 
not the absolute but the relative level of wealth that matters.  
• The most important factor of unhappiness is unemployment, even when income remains the same.  
• Individuals evaluate their utility over the long term falsely. 
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• People in democratic countries are, other circumstances remaining the same, happier than in 
authoritarian societies. They are happiest when they are able to be directly active in democracy 
through the use of initiatives and referendums. 
Psychological economics can contribute more and richer insights for the awareness and shaping of 
companies and societies than standard economics and its empirically false “homunculus oeconomicus”. It 
considerably reduces negative self fulfilling prophecies. The question arises: Does it avoid being bad for 
practice?  
WHY PSYCHOLOGICAL ECONOMICS CAN BE STILL BAD FOR PRACTICE 
Psychological economics is less bad for practice than orthodox economics because it has made some 
critical assumptions about human nature endogenous to theory building. In particular, it shows that 
pro-social behavior is empirically relevant and can be the basis of institutions which strengthen social 
responsibility. However, psychological economics uses a similar methodology as orthodox economics and 
thus runs the danger also of being not good for practice for five methodological reasons. 
 Firstly, as orthodox economics, it takes as starting point formal models, in which just a few variables 
are systematically analyzed. The standard economic model continues to serve as a frame of reference for 
the analytical and the empirical research. Like standard economics, it proceeds from a restricted number of 
assumptions, which are formulated within mathematical models. Some of these variables are introduced 
endogenously into theory building, but most variables are still introduced exogenously, such as rational 
behavior in most experiments which investigate pro-social preferences, for instance. The economist Mayer 
(1993: 53) criticizes this procedure as the “principle of the strongest link”. It is the background to the 
frequent accusation that these models are rigorous but not relevant. Significant variables which do not fit 
the model are ignored. At best, contextual conditions are included ex-post as “weak links” in the form of 
unsystematic, arbitrarily occurring ad-hoc reflections. These ad-hoc reflections stand for the most part in 
stark incongruity to the strict output of the model’s results and the claim to give valid prescriptions to 
practitioners. 
 Secondly, for many scholars, psychological economics is identical to experimental economics. Most 
empirical work in psychological economics is done as laboratory experiments, in which very few variables 
are artificially isolated and changed under controlled conditions. Though external validity is very 
questionable, a lot of scholars claim to derive prescriptions for practitioners (Mullainathan & Thaler, 
2000).  
 Thirdly, the key to explaining observed actions is only sought where the disciplinary lamp is shone. 
The insights of other disciplines are not systematically incorporated. Also, the perspectives and viewpoints 
of practitioners are seen as insignificant. Their potential for reflection is underestimated. This is 
astonishing, given the results of research on the value of laypeople's insights. As in standard economics, 
the results of research into practice in psychological economics are made available without there being any 
feedback into the research process. This problem has been extensively discussed in the field of knowledge 
production using the term Mode 1 as opposed to Mode 2 (Gibbons et al., 1994). Mode 1 research neglects 
that much of practice in most fields remain only partially understood scientifically and that technological 
and social practice and scientific understanding often coevolves (Nelson, 2006; Starbuck, 2006; Stokes, 
1997).  
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Fourthly, it is characteristic of this type of research that it neglects aspects of synthesis in favor of analysis. 
The requirements of discipline-based knowledge with the requirements of business and policy practice are 
left to the practitioner. It follows the IKEA model: Take it home yourself and put it together yourself 
(Mintzberg, 2004, p. 47). This is particularly disadvantageous to management science, which, like other 
problem-oriented fields of research such as engineering sciences, jurisprudence, environmental sciences, 
proceeds explicitly from the concrete questions of practice rather than from problems defined within the 
discipline. Management practice pays no attention to disciplines (Steinmann & Schreyögg, 2005). Its 
nature is “a-disciplinary”.  
 Fifthly, psychological economics and orthodox economics both claim to be the “queen of social 
science”. This goes so far that the results of other social disciplines, like social psychology, are mostly 
ignored, though these disciplines deal with similar questions and apply similar empirical methods. But any 
form of disciplinary imperialism restricts scientific progress.  
 As a consequence, psychological economics, like standard economics, is very often rigorous, but not 
relevant for problem solving outside the laboratory. Although psychological economics is clearly better for 
practice than standard economics, it still is not good for practice. 
FROM ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM TO MULTIDISCIPLINARY MAPPING 
What must a research strategy look like if it is to be good for practice while at the same time overcoming 
the frequently discussed trade-off between rigor and relevance (e.g. Donaldson, 1995; Huff, 2000; 
Pettigrew, 2001, Stokes, 1997)? We suggest the research strategy of “multidisciplinary mapping” and give 
reasons why it is most appropriate to support at the same time problem solving in management practice 
and scholarly understanding of research questions.  
 Maps are theoretically based reference anchors, offering precise terminology with regard to specific 
contents. They provide frames for action to start from (Fiol & Huff, 1992; Weick, 1990), without 
determining action. Maps describe navigation devices that may solve a given problem, but offer no 
guarantees for doing so. Maps are a vehicle for transferring theoretical insights to scholars from other 
disciplines without using a theory-specific language. Thus, they enable better communication between 
different disciplinary approaches. Dogan and Pahre (1991) show empirically that the most important 
innovations in social science took place at the borders between single disciplines. Maps help practitioners 
to analyze their problems more systematically. Although maps use a precise terminology, they neither 
establish causal laws or regularities, nor do they offer “blueprints”. Instead, maps can be used as different 
“walking sticks” to reveal possible unintentional consequences of intended actions (Roethlisberger, 1977). 
They can also be used as different “talking sticks” in argumentation processes to consider propositions and 
to come to an agreement (Scherer & Dowling, 1995). What is crucial, maps do not claim to translate 
theoretical insights gained by one discipline (e.g. orthodox or psychological economics or psychology) into 
instructions for practitioners in the form of a “tautological transformation” (Popper, 1959). Rather, they 
provide frames of reference in order to throw spotlights on the territory.  
 Multidisciplinary mapping is the provision of different disciplinary maps which provide orientation in 
a complex territory. The aim of multidisciplinary mapping is to gain insights from the differences between 
these different maps and to exploit these differences. What matters is to provide practitioners and scholars 
from other disciplines with findings from different theoretical approaches in a language they understand so 
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that they can triangulate methods and models with respect to their problems (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006; 
Starbuck, 2006). Thus, we propose multidisciplinary mapping as an effective method for leveraging the 
different knowledge contributions that practitioners and scholars make with regard to the question of what 
is good for practice and theory building.  
CONCLUSION 
A theory that is socially responsible and good for practice must have no truck with imperialism of any kind. 
Instead, it must sensitize scholars as well as practitioners to the broad range of views and issues involved. 
We examine that “multidisciplinary mapping” reduces the overconfidence of scholars in their models, and 
supports practitioners to express their problems and experiences in a more precise terminology. 
Multidisciplinary mapping addresses the dual purpose of management studies: to achieve a deep 
understanding of the research question for creating scientifically meaningful research, while at the same 
time advancing problem solving in management practice. Thus not only is multidisciplinary mapping good 
for socially responsible practice, it is also good for theory building.  
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NOTES 
     1 Psychological economics is often referred to in the Anglo-Saxon world as behavioral economics. 
However, this description is misleading. In psychology, the term ‘behaviorist’ denotes a scientific approach 
which exclusively investigates observable stimulus-response relationships (e.g. Watson, 1913), and 
disregards internal psychological cognitive and motivational processes. 
     2 C.f. Rabin (1998) gives an exceptional overview of this branch of research. 
     3
 Variable and performance-related rewards are not negative in principle, c.f. Frey (1997) and Frey & 
Osterloh (2002). Where extrinsic motivation predominates in an activity, variable pay produces a positive 
total effect on performance. However, variable pay always costs more than it appears to at first glance, 
because the hidden costs of reward must be added to the monetary costs of variable pay. This effect was 
demonstrated in detail by a vignette experiment involving professionals by Weibel, Rost and Osterloh 
(2007), which looked into the “black box” of cognitive and motivational processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
